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INTRODUCTION 
 
“As for nursing in the restroom—half the time I don’t even want 
to use a public restroom for its intended purposes.” Helen, 
Virginia1
 
Until recently, Ohio mothers and their infants had something to cry 
about due to the state’s lack of protection for women breastfeeding in 
public.2  However, a new law provides hope of protection after the state’s 
legal battle with public breastfeeding.3  A recent Sixth Circuit case 
highlighted public breastfeeding as a legal issue and demonstrated that 
Ohio’s Civil Rights Act, which protects women from sex discrimination, 
lacks legal protection for mothers who breastfeed in public.4  The court, in 
Derungs v. Wal-Mart Stores, concluded that Ohio storeowners and 
managers of public businesses may restrict or even ban breastfeeding in 
their stores, despite the state’s explicit prohibition against sex 
discrimination in places of public accommodation.5  In response, Ohio 
followed a recent state trend and enacted legislation aimed at protecting 
women who choose to breastfeed in public.6  Without state protection, 
breastfeeding discrimination may occur—which constitutes harassment of, 
or refusal to provide public accommodations to, women who breastfeed in 
public.7
Ohio’s new law has been implemented in direct response to judicial 
refusal to extend various existing sex discrimination frameworks to protect 
 1. See Editorial, Breast (and Worst) Case Scenarios, WASH. POST, Aug. 14, 2004, at 
A10 (recounting several reader responses to a Washington Post staff writer’s article on 
breastfeeding). 
 2. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02(G) (West 2004) (prohibiting discrimination 
based on sex in places of public accommodation); Derungs v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 374 
F.3d 428, 430 (6th Cir. 2004) [hereinafter Derungs] (holding that Ohio’s Public 
Accommodation Statute (“OPAS”) does not prohibit storeowners or managers of places of 
public accommodation from restricting or banning breastfeeding in their stores or 
establishments). 
 3. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3781.55 (West 2005) (requiring places of public 
accommodation to allow mothers to breastfeed their children). 
 4. See Derungs, 374 F.3d at 430 (finding that OPAS does not prohibit a storeowner’s 
ban on breastfeeding because such a restriction does not constitute discrimination based on 
sex). 
 5. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02(G) (prohibiting storeowners or employees 
from denying full enjoyment or use of places of public accommodation on the basis of an 
individual’s sex); see also Derungs, 374 F.3d at 439 (holding that prohibitions on 
breastfeeding do not amount to sex discrimination). 
 6. See, e.g., CAL. CIVIL CODE § 43.3 (West 1997) (protecting a woman’s right to 
breastfeed her child in public); accord N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:4B-4 (West 2004). 
 7. See Derungs, 374 F.3d at 430 (describing Wal-Mart’s prohibition of breastfeeding, 
which required mothers, such as Ms. Derungs, to stop breastfeeding or leave the store). 
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women who breastfeed in public from discrimination.8  This new law will 
better protect a woman’s choice to breastfeed in public.9  Although this law 
does not directly nullify the Derungs decision, it offers protection outside 
of a sex discrimination or public accommodation framework for women 
who do breastfeed in public.  Derungs foreclosed the use of Ohio’s Public 
Accommodation Statute (“OPAS”), part of the Ohio Civil Rights Act, 
through its prohibition of sex discrimination, as an avenue to protect public 
breastfeeding.10  The new law, in part, corrects the judicial refusal to 
protect public breastfeeding by giving mothers an affirmative right to 
breastfeed in buildings of public accommodation.11  While this law 
demonstrates Ohio’s intent to correct the effect of the Derungs holding, it is 
not entirely clear whether this law will be as effective in overruling 
Derungs as legislation amending OPAS would have been.  12
Part I of this Comment examines breastfeeding as a legal issue under 
both Ohio state law and federal law.13  Part II of this Comment argues that, 
until recently, Ohio law did not adequately protect mothers against 
prohibitions or restrictions on breastfeeding due to the Sixth Circuit’s 
narrow interpretation of OPAS’s prohibition of sex discrimination in 
Derungs.14  Part II also describes federal courts’ use of the Title VII 
comparability analysis in employment cases and the extension of this 
analysis to the public accommodation discrimination claim in Derungs.15  
Moreover, Part II discusses the Derungs ruling as a form of discrimination 
against women.16  Finally, this Comment advocates the need for more 
 8. See infra Part II (arguing that, as exemplified by Derungs, the prohibition of sex 
discrimination under OPAS inadequately protects public breastfeeding, because courts have 
ruled that discriminatory acts towards breastfeeding do not constitute sex discrimination). 
 9. See infra Part II.D (asserting that a woman’s choice to breastfeed is affected by her 
ability to breastfeed in public); see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3781.55 (West 2005) (Ohio 
2005) (giving mothers an affirmative right to breastfeed in places of public 
accommodation). 
 10. See infra Part II.A (explaining that the Derungs court interpreted OPAS to exclude 
discriminatory acts towards breastfeeding women from the definition of discrimination 
based on sex). 
 11. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3781.55 (West 2005) (allowing women to breastfeed 
in public by requiring buildings of public accommodation to allow the act). 
 12. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.05(B) (West 2005) (establishing the procedure 
for filing a complaint of discrimination with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission).  OPAS, 
unlike the newly amended building standards section of Ohio law, confers a private right of 
action for victims of discrimination.  Id. 
 13. See generally infra Part I (outlining the federal programs that promote public 
breastfeeding, as well as discussing court treatment of breastfeeding discrimination claims, 
OPAS and subsequent case law holding that OPAS does not prohibit restrictions or bans on 
public breastfeeding). 
 14. See infra Part II.A (arguing that Derungs incorrectly foreclosed the possibility of 
interpreting OPAS to protect public breastfeeding in Ohio). 
 15. See infra Part II.B (explaining that the comparability analysis is outdated and 
ignores the fact that, like pregnancy, breastfeeding is sex-specific in nature). 
 16. See infra Part II.C (asserting that the logic behind pregnancy as a sex-specific 
characteristic, which leads to classification of pregnancy discrimination as a form of sex 
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states to follow Ohio’s steps and enact new laws that promote the legal 
protection for public breastfeeding through alternative legislation.17  This 
Comment concludes that state legal frameworks that do not protect women 
who breastfeed from discrimination are inconsistent with the federal policy 
promoting breastfeeding and, therefore, alternative legislation protecting 
the practice is critical to gain consistency with these policies.18
I.  BACKGROUND 
Breastfeeding provides countless health and social benefits for infants, 
mothers, and society.19  Federal policy even promotes breastfeeding and 
recognizes its many benefits.20  Women have a constitutional right to 
decide to breastfeed their children.21  Many state criminal statutes exclude 
exposure of the female breast while breastfeeding from indecency statutes 
and most states protect a woman’s right to breastfeed publicly.22  However, 
until earlier this year, the state of Ohio had failed to adopt any such law or 
policy to protect and promote breastfeeding.23  Ohio’s new law is an 
attempt to align Ohio law with the laws of other states that explicitly 
discrimination, also applies to breastfeeding). 
 17. See infra Part II.D (proposing that the importance of promoting breastfeeding and 
the lack of protection in the existing sex discrimination frameworks necessitate legislative 
alternatives to protect against breastfeeding discrimination). 
 18. See infra Conclusion (arguing that Derungs exemplifies the need for express 
legislation protecting breastfeeding); see also infra Part I.C (highlighting a number of 
federal programs promoting breastfeeding including, for example, the Special Supplemental 
Program for Women, Infants, and Children). 
 19. See OFFICE ON WOMEN’S HEALTH, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HHS 
BLUEPRINT FOR ACTION ON BREASTFEEDING 10-11 (2000) [hereinafter BLUEPRINT]  
(enumerating the benefits of breastfeeding, including enhancing children’s resistance to 
infection, reducing the risk of certain cancers for breastfeeding mothers and decreasing 
family medical costs). 
 20. See, e.g., MATERNAL & CHILD HEALTH BUREAU, HEALTH RESOURCES SERVS. ADMIN., 
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. [hereinafter CHILD HEALTH BUREAU] (describing the 
role of the Maternal and Child Health Bureau, which includes providing training and 
publications for local and state authorities to promote breastfeeding), at 
http://www.cdc.gov/breastfeeding/compend-MCHB.htm (last visited July 24, 2005). 
 21. See Dike v. Sch. Bd. of Orange County, 650 F.2d 783, 787 (5th Cir. Unit B July 
1981) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment’s implicit protection of certain privacy 
interests includes a woman’s decision to breastfeed). 
 22. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 01.10.060(b) (Michie 2004) (excluding breastfeeding 
from the definitions of “lewd conduct,” “lewd touching,” “immoral conduct” and “indecent 
conduct”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 800.03 (West 2004) (exempting a breastfeeding mother from 
an indecent exposure statute); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-9(a)(2) (West 2004) (stating 
that breastfeeding does not constitute public indecency); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 245.01 
(McKinney 1983) (amended 1984) (excluding exposure of the breast during breastfeeding 
from the criminal indecent exposure statute). 
 23. See Derungs, 374 F.3d at 430 (holding that banning or restricting breastfeeding in 
places of public accommodation does not violate Ohio's anti-discrimination law).  But see 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3781.55 (West 2005) (amending the building standards code to 
require places of public accommodation to allow mothers to breastfeed their children in 
those places). 
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protect the act of breastfeeding in public.24
A.  Ohio’s Battle with Legal Protection for Public Breastfeeding 
1.  Derungs v. Wal-Mart Stores 
Three women tested the scope of legal protection for public 
breastfeeding under OPAS by filing a complaint against Wal-Mart in Ohio 
state court, alleging that Wal-Mart’s restrictions on breastfeeding violated 
OPAS as discrimination on the basis of age and sex.25  After Wal-Mart 
removed the action to federal court, the district court granted summary 
judgment in favor of Wal-Mart for the sex and age discrimination claims.26  
The women then appealed to the Sixth Circuit for review of the sex 
discrimination claim exclusively.27  The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s judgment, finding that while Ohio courts should construe civil 
rights statutes liberally,28 OPAS does not prohibit restrictions on public 
breastfeeding as a form of discrimination based on sex.29
The Sixth Circuit first looked to the intent of the Ohio Legislature in 
enacting OPAS and concluded that the legislature intended to limit the 
inclusion of claims of pregnancy discrimination as a basis for sex 
discrimination to claims of employment discrimination.30  The court also 
 24. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3781.55 (West 2005) (permitting mothers to breastfeed 
their children in public); accord CAL. CIVIL CODE § 43.3 (West 1997); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
26:4B-4 (West 2004). 
 25. See Derungs v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 162 F. Supp. 2d 861, 863-65 (S.D. Ohio 
2001) (explaining that Dana Derungs and two other women were nursing in Ohio Wal-Mart 
stores when employees asked them either to nurse in the restroom or leave the store).  The 
women claimed that the store discriminated against them because of their sex because only 
women can breastfeed.  Id., aff’d, 374 F.3d 428 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 26. See Derungs v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 2d 884, 894 (S.D. Ohio 2000) 
(holding that restrictions on breastfeeding do not constitute discrimination based on sex or 
age under OPAS). 
 27. See Derungs, 374 F.3d at 431 n.1 (noting that the plaintiffs waived appeal for 
failure to brief their tort claims and that they affirmatively waived their age discrimination 
claim). 
 28. See id. at 433 (stating that both the Ohio state legislature and the Ohio Supreme 
Court support the notion that Ohio courts should construe civil rights statutes liberally); see 
also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.08 (West 2004) (explaining that Ohio courts must 
construe all provisions under the Ohio Civil Rights Act, including OPAS, liberally); Ohio 
Civil Rights Comm’n v. Lysyj, 313 N.E.2d. 3, 6 (Ohio 1974) (constructing the definition of 
a place of public accommodation under OPAS liberally to comply with the congressional 
purpose behind its enactment). 
 29. See Derungs, 374 F.3d at 436-37 (finding that the language and legislative history 
of the statute point to a definition of discrimination on the basis of sex that does not include 
breastfeeding discrimination). 
 30. See id. at 436 (reasoning that, because the legislature amended sections (A)—(F) of 
Ohio’s Civil Rights Act, but not section (G) to adopt the language of the PDA, the 
legislature only intended to include pregnancy discrimination in the definition of sex 
discrimination in those amended provisions); see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 
4112.02(A)-(H) (noting that sections (A)-(F) prohibit employers from discrimination on the 
basis of sex, while section (H) pertains not to employers, but owners of places of public 
accommodation). 
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looked to federal employment law in its analysis.31  The court explained 
that, while Congress meant to overrule the Supreme Court’s decision in 
General Electric Co. v. Gilbert by enacting the Pregnancy Discrimination 
Act (“PDA”), the court may still employ the comparability analysis set 
forth in Gilbert. 32  In following this analysis, courts compare women to 
men in similar circumstances to decide a valid claim of discrimination 
based on sex.  Federal courts and state courts following a federal sex 
discrimination framework employ this analysis, resulting in the exclusion 
of breastfeeding from protections for sex discrimination claims.33
2.  Ohio’s Public Accommodation Statute 
OPAS, like Title II of the federal Civil Rights Act, provides that “[i]t 
shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice” for: 
[A]ny proprietor or any employee, keeper, or manager of a place of 
public accommodation to deny to any person, except for reasons 
applicable alike to all persons regardless of race, color, religion, sex, 
national origin, disability, age, or ancestry, the full enjoyment of the 
accommodations, advantages, facilities, or privileges of the place of 
public accommodation.34
 31. See Derungs, 374 F.3d at 434 (explaining that Ohio courts use the Title VII analysis 
to interpret the Ohio Civil Rights Act). 
 32. See id. at 435 (reasoning that since the Ohio Legislature passed OPAS before the 
Supreme Court overruled Gilbert, the reasoning of Gilbert applied to OPAS); see also Gen. 
Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 127-30 (1976) (holding that General Electric’s disability 
plan did not violate Title VII, even though it excluded coverage for pregnancy related 
medical costs for the spouses of male employees, because there was no benefit the plan 
provided for men that it did not provide for women). 
 33. See, e.g., Derungs, 374 F.3d at 430, 438 (invoking the Gilbert comparability 
analysis and finding that OPAS does not protect women from discrimination based on 
breastfeeding). 
 34. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02(G); see Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 
2000a (2000) (prohibiting discrimination based on race, color, religion or national origin in 
places of public accommodation); see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.01 (A)(9) 
(including a restaurant, a barbershop, a public store or place of amusement as examples of 
places of public accommodation). 
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The statute is part of Ohio’s Civil Rights Act, which also prohibits 
employers, employment agencies, labor organizations, property owners and 
housing financers from discriminatory practices.35  The Ohio Legislature 
amended a number of sections of the Civil Rights Act to include the 
language of the PDA in 1980.36
The Ohio Supreme Court only had the opportunity to interpret OPAS 
once, in Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Lysyj, and found that the owner 
of a trailer park violated the rights of a white resident under the statute. 37  
Importantly, however, the court decided Lysyj when OPAS only prohibited 
discrimination for reasons of race, color, religion, national origin and 
ancestry.38  A lower Ohio court later addressed OPAS in Meyers v. Hot 
Bagels, after the legislature amended the statute to include sex, rejecting a 
claim of sex discrimination.39
3.  Ohio’s New Breastfeeding Law 
In 1994, the Ohio Legislature considered public breastfeeding as a legal 
issue for the first time.40  The legislature, however, failed to enact the 
amendment, which would have protected a woman’s right to breastfeed in 
public.41  Several years later, in 1999, Representative Dixie J. Allen 
proposed a bill to amend Ohio’s criminal code to protect public 
breastfeeding.42  However, that bill died in the House Criminal Justice 
 35. Compare OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4112.02(A)-(F),(H) (prohibiting discrimination 
by using the terms “because of” or “on the basis of” race, sex, religion and other categories), 
with id. § 4112.02(G) (prohibiting discrimination “except for reasons applicable alike to all 
persons regardless of” sex). 
 36. See id. § 4112.01(B) (stating that sections (A) through (F) of the Act are amended 
to reflect that the terms “because of sex” and “on the basis of sex” should include “because 
of or on the basis of pregnancy . . . .”). 
 37. See 313 N.E.2d at 1, 6 (holding that an owner of a trailer park denied a white 
woman full enjoyment of the accommodations of the park because she was entertaining 
black guests). 
 38. Compare id. at 5 (explaining that OPAS, as of 1974, only prohibits discrimination 
on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin and ancestry), with OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 4112.02(G) (prohibiting discrimination based on race, color, religion, national 
origin, disability, age, ancestry and sex). 
 39. See Meyers v. Hot Bagels Factory, Inc., 721 N.E.2d 1068, 1082-83 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1999) (denying a woman’s claim that a storeowner’s harassment, which was also directed at 
male employees and customers, violated OPAS as sex discrimination).  The court reasoned 
that the appropriate test for discrimination is simply whether the denial of enjoyment is 
applicable to all persons.  Id. 
 40. See S.B. 342, 120th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 1993-1994) (proposing to 
amend the Ohio code to protect a woman’s right to breastfeed in public); see also Mother 
and Child: Suitable for Art, But Not Museum Exhibits, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 17, 
1994, at A2 (reporting that the Ohio Legislature considered an amendment to protect public 
breastfeeding following a Toledo museum’s negative response to a breastfeeding mother). 
 41. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02 (prohibiting only discrimination in places of 
public accommodation based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, disability and 
age). 
 42. See H.B. 328, 123d Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 1999) (proposing to give women 
an affirmative right to breastfeed in any public or private place, and to exclude exposure of 
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committee without ever receiving a hearing.43
In August 2004, one month after the Derungs decision, Representative 
Patricia Clancy responded to the holding’s effect by sponsoring a bill 
proposing not to amend OPAS, but instead to amend the code’s section on 
building standards to allow women to breastfeed in public.44  The bill 
passed in the House Committee on Health, but the General Assembly 
adjourned before the bill could reach the Senate.45  At that time, media 
opinion about the likely success of the bill was relatively negative.46
Representative Clancy subsequently won a seat on the Ohio State Senate 
and reintroduced the proposal during the 126th General Assembly.47  The 
proposed legislation was similar to laws in other states, which protect 
public breastfeeding by giving mothers an affirmative right to breastfeed in 
public.48  However, the law’s sponsor has taken a more conservative 
approach than other states, evidenced by the statute’s position in the 
building standards code rather than in OPAS or another provision of the 
Civil Rights Act.49
The law passed unanimously in the Senate and passed the House with 
the breast during breastfeeding from the definition of “nudity” under sex offense laws). 
 43. See E-mail from Lakeisha Hilton, Aide to Rep. Dixie J. Allen, Ohio House of 
Representatives, to Brianne Whelan (Jan. 26, 2005, 09:12 EST) (on file with author) 
[hereinafter Hilton E-mail] (stating that the bill never received a hearing in the Criminal 
Justice committee and ultimately expired at the end of the legislative session). 
 44. See H.B. 554, 125th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2004) (proposing to enact 
Section 3781.55 of the code, which governs building standards, so that a “mother is entitled 
to breast-feed her baby in any location of a place of public accommodation wherein the 
mother otherwise is permitted”). 
 45. See Hilton E-mail, supra note 43 (stating that the bill never became law despite it 
passing through the committee hearing with only one opposition vote). 
 46. See, e.g., Laura A. Bischoff, Breastfeeding Bill Introduced in Ohio House, DAYTON 
DAILY NEWS, Sept. 24, 2004, at 4B (stating that even the bill’s sponsor was not very 
optimistic about the likelihood of passage, given the fact that it was introduced so close to 
the end of the legislative session).  But see Telephone Interview with Erika Cybulskis, Aide 
to Ohio State Sen. Patricia Clancy (Jan. 28, 2005) [hereinafter Cybulskis Interview] (stating 
that the media’s pessimism was likely based on opinions of those involved with the 
breastfeeding debate in Ohio for many years who experienced opposition in previous 
attempts to promote the issue).  For example, one woman who testified during a hearing for 
the 1999 bill recalled how a male legislator harassed her after her testimony.  Id. 
 47. See S.B. 41, 126th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005) (demonstrating Senator 
Clancy’s proposed legislation to protect breastfeeding mothers); see also Cybulskis 
Interview, supra note 46 (stating that Senator Clancy planned to introduce the bill on 
February 1, 2005 with the anticipated support of a large number of senators). 
 48. Compare OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3781.55 (Ohio 2005) (stating that “[a] mother is 
entitled to breast-feed her baby in any location of a place of public accommodation wherein 
the mother otherwise is permitted”), with N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:4B-4 (West 2004) (providing 
that “a mother shall be entitled to breast feed her baby in any location of a place of public 
accommodation, resort or amusement wherein the mother is otherwise permitted”). 
 49. See Cybulskis Interview, supra note 46 (stating that Senator Clancy considered 
proposing an amendment to the Civil Rights Act, but anticipated a greater likelihood of 
opposition from legislators who believe that breastfeeding does not rise to the same level of 
discrimination as race or sex discrimination). 
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only five opposition votes.50  In the House, one representative offered an 
amendment that would strike the word “entitled” from the text of the law.51  
This proposal was likely a result of fear that breastfeeding would be 
equated with other civil rights such as freedom from race discrimination.  
Even the bill’s sponsor shared this concern and declined to propose the bill 
as an amendment to the civil rights statute, but instead to the building 
standards code.52  However, a majority of members opposed the proposed 
amendment and the law was passed as originally introduced.53  The law is 
effective after September 16, 2005.54
4.  Exclusion of Breastfeeding from State Criminal Statutes 
In addition to enacting a new law permitting women to breastfeed in 
public, other state legislators should be aware that criminal laws present 
other potential barriers to public breastfeeding.55  States have recently 
begun to exclude breastfeeding from statutes that criminalize indecent 
exposure.56  The Ohio Court of Appeals, for example, interpreted Ohio’s 
indecent exposure statute as excluding exposure of the female breast from 
criminal liability, effectively excluding breastfeeding in public from 
possible punishable offenses.57  However, as the previous lack of 
protection in Ohio demonstrated, a change in criminal liability alone does 
not necessarily lead to the legal protection of public breastfeeding.58
 50. See E-mail from Erika Cybulskis, Legislative Aide to Senator Patricia Clancy, Ohio 
Senate, to Brianne Whelan (May 12, 2005, 02:21 EST) (on file with author) (reporting that 
Senate Bill 41 passed the Senate by a vote of 32-0); E-mail from Erika Cybulskis, 
Legislative Aide to Senator Patricia Clancy, Ohio Senate, to Brianne Whelan (May 18, 
2005, 04:45 EST) (on file with author) (indicating that Senate Bill 41 passed the House by a 
vote of 92-5). 
 51. See E-mail from Erika Cybulskis, Legislative Aide to Senator Patricia Clancy, Ohio 
Senate, to Brianne Whelan (May 19, 2005, 01:27 EST) (on file with author) (stating that 
Representative Diana Fessler proposed that the language instead read that promoting 
breastfeeding is part of the state's “strong public policy”). 
 52. See Cybulskis Interview, supra note 46 (stating that the bill’s sponsor decided on a 
more conservative approach than proposing to amend the civil rights statute, an approach 
that had failed in pass legislatures). 
 53. See id. (stating that the amendment was quashed after a vote of 52-45 in favor of 
opposition). 
 54. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3781.55 (West 2005). 
 55. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1402 (West 2004) (criminalizing exposure of 
the areola or nipple of the female breast as a sexual offense); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 11, § 764 
(2004) (classifying exposure of the female breast as a sexual offense misdemeanor). 
 56. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 245.01 (excluding breastfeeding from an indecent 
exposure statute that prohibits exposure of the female breast). 
 57. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.09 (defining exposure of a “private part” as a 
misdemeanor); State v. Jetter, 599 N.E.2d 733, 733 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (per curiam) 
(finding that the Ohio public indecency statute does not consider the female breast a “private 
part”). 
 58. See Derungs, 374 F.3d at 430 (holding that a public store’s policy banning 
breastfeeding and allowing employees to ask breastfeeding mothers to leave or go to the 
bathroom did not violate Ohio law); Jetter, 599 N.E.2d at 733 (holding that exposure of the 
female breast does not qualify as a criminal indecency misdemeanor in Ohio). 
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B.  Federal Framework for Examining Breastfeeding Discrimination 
Claims 
1.  General Electric Company v. Gilbert and Comparability Analysis 
States that do not expressly protect breastfeeding but do protect women 
from sex discrimination may not be adequately protecting breastfeeding as 
demonstrated by the court’s decision in Derungs.59  The court used an 
employment discrimination analysis to examine whether restrictions on 
breastfeeding amounted to discrimination based on sex.60  Before the PDA, 
the United States Supreme Court effectively excluded distinctions based on 
pregnancy from claims of employment discrimination based on sex by 
examining the subgroups that resulted from the challenged practice’s 
division.61  In General Electric Company v. Gilbert and Geduldig v. Aiello, 
the Court defined the comparable groups created by an employer’s 
disability plan as pregnant women and non-pregnant persons, and thus 
foreclosed the possibility of analyzing the issue as a form of employment 
discrimination based on sex.62
The Supreme Court, in deciding Gilbert in 1976, considered whether 
differential treatment of pregnant women was a form of sex-based 
discrimination protected by Title VII.63  The Court analyzed this question 
using a Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection test.64  The Court held 
that pregnancy discrimination, in the form of exclusion of pregnancy from 
an employer’s disability plan, did not amount to a type of sex 
discrimination because pregnancy does not fall under the traditional notion 
of sex discrimination.65
 59. See Derungs, 374 F.3d at 430 (holding that breastfeeding is not covered by the 
PDA). 
 60. See id. at 437-38 (holding that Ohio courts apply the federal Title VII comparability  
analysis in cases challenging the public accommodation statute). 
 61. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 495-97 (1974) (holding that distinctions 
based on pregnancy do not constitute sex discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment); see also Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 138-40 (holding that as in 
Geduldig, distinctions based on pregnancy do not constitute sex-based discrimination). 
 62. See Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 138-39 (defining pregnancy as a “risk” unique to women 
and asserting that because the plan does not protect any risk for men that is not protected for 
women, that distinction cannot be drawn by sex); Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496 n.20 (asserting 
that the second subgroup, non-pregnant persons, obviously has both female and male 
members, so that distinction necessarily cannot be drawn by sex). 
 63. See 429 U.S. at 127-30 (assessing whether General Electric’s exclusion of 
pregnancy from its disability benefits plan violated Title VII’s ban on sex-based 
discrimination). 
 64. See id. at 133-36 (upholding General Electric’s disability benefits plan, which 
excluded disabilities resulting from pregnancy, such as miscarriage or the disabling six-
week to eight-week period during a normal pregnancy).  The Supreme Court reasoned that 
distinctions based on pregnancy are not really sex-based distinctions, but instead distinctions 
between pregnant and non-pregnant persons.  Id. at 135. 
 65. See id. at 145 (stating that the traditional notion of sex discrimination compares 
treatment of men to treatment of women in similar circumstances, and that the Court should 
not infer that Congress sought to broaden this traditional concept of sex discrimination to 
12
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In Derungs, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s use of Title 
VII’s comparability analysis, which required the court to compare the 
plaintiff with similarly situated members of the opposite sex to determine 
whether the challenged practice is discriminatory.66  The court, employing 
this analysis, found Wal-Mart’s restrictions valid because the restrictions 
did not treat women differently than men; the policy did not permit either 
sex to feed their children in Wal-Mart stores.67  States that follow a federal 
sex discrimination framework will employ this type of analysis; therefore, 
sex discrimination statues in these states will not protect public 
breastfeeding. 
The Derungs court also addressed the necessity of comparability analysis 
in sex-plus discrimination claims, where the plaintiff alleges that the 
discrimination stems from her sex in addition to some sex-neutral factor.68  
The Sixth Circuit held that sex-plus discrimination also required 
comparison to a class of similarly situated males possessing the same sex-
neutral characteristic in order to prove discrimination based on a woman’s 
sex.69
2.  Title VII and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act 
Two years after the Supreme Court’s ruling in Gilbert, Congress passed 
the PDA, which amended Title VII and broadened the meaning of sex 
discrimination in employment by prohibiting discrimination against 
pregnant women.70  Congress followed the logic of Justice Stevens’s 
dissent in Gilbert, finding that distinctions based on pregnancy were indeed 
distinctions based on sex.71  Congress sought to ensure that pregnancy 
include pregnancy). 
 66. See Derungs, 374 F.3d. at 437 (requiring that the court define a comparable class of 
people to compare with the plaintiffs in order to prove discrimination).  The Sixth Circuit 
found that there was no differential treatment between the sexes and therefore no valid claim 
of sex-based discrimination.  Id. at 439. 
 67. See id. at 437 (stating that feeding infants breast milk is not sex-specific so that 
Wal-Mart’s restriction does not treat females differently than males); Derungs, 141 F. Supp. 
2d at 890 (explaining that Wal-Mart’s restriction applied to two groups: (1) women who 
breastfeed; and (2) individuals who do not breastfeed, and because the second group 
included members of both sexes, the distinction was not discriminatory). 
 68. See Derungs, 374 F.3d at 438 n.8 (defining sex-plus discrimination as occurring 
“when a person is subjected to disparate treatment based not only on her sex, but on her sex 
considered in conjunction with a second characteristic”); see also Phillips v. Martin Marietta 
Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (examining whether an individual's sex in addition to a sex-
neutral characteristic constituted sex discrimination under Title VII).  In Phillips, the sex-
neutral characteristic was that the plaintiff had preschool-age children.  Id. 
 69. See Derungs, 374 F.3d at 438-39 (asserting that there was no class of similarly 
situated breastfeeding men). 
 70. See Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000) (defining 
the Title VII’s terms “because of sex” and “on the basis of sex” to include pregnancy). 
 71. See id.; see also Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 161-62 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that 
because the capacity to become pregnant differentiates men from women, the disability plan 
that did not cover pregnancy benefits discriminated based on sex). 
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discrimination was a per se violation of Title VII.72  Thus, courts would not 
have to apply a Title VII comparability or “impact approach,” but instead 
could conclude that pregnancy discrimination violated Title VII per se as a 
type of discrimination based on sex.73  In 1983, in Newport News v. EEOC, 
the Supreme Court recognized that Congress intended to overrule Gilbert 
with the passage of the PDA.74  The Court in Newport News made it clear 
that a facial distinction between men and women based on pregnancy, at 
least in an employer’s insurance plan, constituted discrimination based on 
sex.75
C.  Federal Promotion of Breastfeeding 
Through the creation of a number of agencies and initiatives, the federal 
government recognized the value of breastfeeding and extended education, 
counseling, and support to promote the practice.76  In 1975, Congress 
established the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, 
Infants, and Children (“WIC”) as a permanent program to provide nutrition 
counseling and other social services to low-income pregnant and 
breastfeeding women.77  In 1984, the Office of the Surgeon General held 
its first workshop on breastfeeding.78
 72. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-948, at 3 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4749, 4751 
(stating that making such discrimination a per se violation of Title VII would eliminate the 
need to rely on impact analysis because pregnancy discrimination is not, by itself, sex 
discrimination). 
 73. See id. (stating that the “impact approach,” similar to, yet distinct from the the 
comparability  analysis, left employers and employees to speculate as to which distinctions 
based on pregnancy would violate Title VII); see also Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 
136, 141-42 (1977) (employing an “impact approach” as an alternative to the traditional 
Title VII analysis).  The “impact approach” examines whether the alleged discriminatory 
practice burdens one sex over the other.  Id.  The Court held that a policy that deprived 
women who take maternity leave of seniority constituted sex discrimination because the 
policy had a disparate impact on women.  Id. at 142. 
 74. See Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 676, 678 
(1983) (citing the plain language of the PDA, as well as House and Senate Committee 
reports, to infer that Congress intended to include pregnancy as a basis for discrimination 
“because of sex” or “on the basis of sex”). 
 75. See id. at 683-84 (invalidating an employer’s insurance program that differentiated 
hospitalization coverage for spouses of male employees and female employees). 
 76. See, e.g., CHILD HEALTH BUREAU, supra note 20 (stating that the Department of 
Health and Human Services established the Children’s Bureau in 1912 as part of a 
commitment to improving the health of mothers and children). 
 77. See FOOD AND NUTRITION SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., LEGIS. HISTORY OF 
BREASTFEEDING PROMOTION REQUIREMENTS IN WIC, [hereinafter LEGIS. HISTORY] 
(describing a number of services provided under the WIC initiative, including providing 
breastpumps), at http://www.fns.usda.gov/wic/Breastfeeding/ bflegishistory.htm (last visited 
July 24, 2005). 
 78. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., REPORT OF THE SURGEON GEN.’S 
WORKSHOP ON BREASTFEEDING & HUMAN LACTATION, No. HRS-D-MC 84-2, 78-79 (1984) 
(stating that initiatives stressed at the workshop included: strengthening of support of 
breastfeeding in the health care system, improvements in professional education, public 
education and promotion of breastfeeding, development of community support services, 
initiation of a national promotion effort directed to working women and expanding research 
on breastfeeding). 
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In 1992, Congress officially recognized the importance of encouraging 
breastfeeding by amending the Child Nutrition Act to include a national 
breastfeeding promotion program.79  This program authorized the Secretary 
of Agriculture to distribute materials and funds to promote breastfeeding as 
an acceptable and desirable practice.80  The Department of Health and 
Human Services also promotes breastfeeding through its oversight of the 
Maternal and Child Health Bureau.81
D.  State Laws and Statistics on Breastfeeding 
In 2003, a Center for Disease Control survey revealed that about 64.5 
percent of children in Ohio were breastfed at some point during infancy.82  
Ohio was one of a number of states that performed significantly lower than 
the Department of Health and Human Services Healthy People 2010 
objective, which was seventy-five percent of mothers breastfeeding 
children at some point during infancy.83  Some states, like California, 
which legally protects public breastfeeding, exceeded this objective.84  In 
order to reach the desirable objectives set by the Department of Health and 
Human Services, more states should follow Ohio’s recent legislative 
response to lacking protection for public breastfeeding.85
 79. See Child Nutrition Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-342, 106 Stat. 911 
(1992) (recognizing that breastfeeding is the best method for healthy infant nutrition); see 
also H.R. REP. NO. 102-645, at 4 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 755, 757 
(recognizing that the lack of support for breastfeeding is a major barrier to promoting the 
practice).  The promotion of breastfeeding is necessary because of the physical and 
emotional benefits of breastfeeding, which include the protection of infants from ear 
infections, diarrhea and respiratory illness.  Id. 
 80. See LEGIS. HISTORY, supra note 77 (stating that federal, state and local entities 
should carry out the program’s goals of fostering acceptance of all breastfeeding). 
 81. See CHILD HEALTH BUREAU, supra note 20 (stating that Title V of the Social 
Security Act authorizes the Bureau to promote breastfeeding through training, publications 
and participation in the United States Breastfeeding Committee). 
 82. See NAT’L CTR. FOR CHRONIC DISEASE PREVENTION & HEALTH PROMOTION, DEP’T 
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 2003 NAT’L IMMUNIZATION SURVEY, TABLE 2: GEOGRAPHIC-
SPECIFIC BREASTFEEDING RATES [hereinafter IMMUNIZATION SURVEY] (reporting the 
percentage of U.S. children breastfed in each state as a part of a nationwide survey using 
telephone and follow-up mail surveys), at http://www.cdc.gov/breastfeeding/NIS_data/ 
state.htm (last visited July 24, 2005). 
 83. See id. (reporting that Ohio, Pennsylvania, Michigan, Oklahoma, Indiana and 
Kentucky had percentages ranging from 56.5 percent to 64.5 percent, and Louisiana had the 
lowest rate of 46.4 percent). 
 84. See id. (reporting that 83.7 percent of mothers in California breastfed their infants at 
some point during the first six months of infancy); see also CAL. CIVIL CODE § 43.3 (West 
1997) (protecting a mother’s right to breastfeed her child in any private or public location). 
 85. Compare CAL. CIVIL CODE § 43.3 (West 1997) (giving mothers a right to breastfeed 
her child) and IMMUNIZATION SURVEY, supra note 82 (reporting that 83.4 percent or mothers 
breastfeed), with Derungs, 374 F.3d at 439 (holding that OPAS does not protect public 
breastfeeding) and IMMUNIZATION SURVEY, supra note 82 (reporting that only 64.5 percent 
mothers breastfeed in Ohio). 
15
Whelan: For Crying Out Loud: Ohio's Legal Battle With Public Breastfeedin
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2005
684 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW  [Vol. 13:3 
                                                          
II.  ANALYSIS 
The Derungs decision foreclosed the possibility of interpreting OPAS to 
protect a woman’s right to breastfeed in public in Ohio.86  While Ohio’s 
new law protects public breastfeeding to a certain extent, it is important for 
states that lack such legislation to take note of the Derungs decision, as it 
another example of narrow judicial interpretation of the PDA.87  The Sixth 
Circuit’s analysis relied on the overruled logic of Gilbert, following a trend 
of resurrecting the pre-PDA analysis in breastfeeding discrimination 
claims.88  As courts continue to ignore the sex-specific nature of 
breastfeeding and refuse to extend the logic of the PDA to breastfeeding 
claims, states that do not expressly protect breastfeeding will not 
adequately protect discrimination against breastfeeding women even if they 
prohibit sex discrimination.89
A.  Ohio’s New Law Combats the Lack of Legal Protection for 
Breastfeeding under Civil Rights Sex Discrimination Law 
Ohio’s new law responded to the effect of the Derungs holding by 
expressly permitting women to breastfeed in buildings of public 
accommodation.90  Until recently, Ohio state law did not adequately 
prohibit breastfeeding discrimination.91  While Ohio’s Civil Rights statute, 
specifically OPAS, includes sex as a ground for discrimination, the Sixth 
Circuit interpreted “sex” as excluding breastfeeding.92  The Supreme Court 
 86. See Derungs, 374 F.3d at 439 (holding that OPAS does not prohibit stores from 
restricting or banning breastfeeding because such prohibition does not constitute sex 
discrimination under the statute). 
 87. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3781.55 (West 2005) (permitting mothers to breastfeed 
in buildings of public accommodation); Derungs, 374 F.4d at 430 (holding that claims of 
breastfeeding discrimination are not actionable under the PDA). 
 88. See Derungs, 374 F.3d at 438 (following federal cases involving breastfeeding 
discrimination claims that employed a Gilbert comparability analysis); see also, e.g., 
Martinez v. NBC, Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 305, 308-11 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (mem.) (invoking 
Gilbert as the appropriate analysis and holding that an employer’s failure to protect a 
woman’s ability to pump breast milk in private did not violate Title VII’s prohibition of sex 
discrimination). 
 89. See Derungs, 374 F.3d at 430, 439 (stating that although the act requires distinctly 
female characteristics, restrictions on breastfeeding do not constitute sex discrimination and 
are therefore not protected under the accommodation statute in Ohio). 
 90. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3781.55 (West 2005) (amending the civil code’s 
building standards section to allow women to breastfeed in places of public 
accommodation). 
 91. See Derungs, 374 F.3d at 439 (holding that OPAS does not prohibit regulation of 
breastfeeding as a form of sex discrimination).  Therefore, the court found that Wal-Mart’s 
policy, which instructed employees to ask breastfeeding women to leave its stores, was not 
discriminatory under Ohio law.  Id. 
 92. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02(G) (prohibiting owners or managers of places 
of public accommodation from denying full enjoyment of accommodations for reason of 
sex); see also Derungs, 374 F.3d at 437, 439 (holding that prohibiting public breastfeeding 
is not a form of sex discrimination because restrictions on breastfeeding do not treat one sex 
differently than the other). 
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has not considered this issue, but a number of federal courts agree that 
restricting or prohibiting breastfeeding is not a form of sex 
discrimination.93  These cases, relying on the outdated logic of the Gilbert 
decision, refused to extend Congress’s intent to establish pregnancy as sex 
discrimination to breastfeeding.94  Ohio’s new law, although conservative, 
is a crucial step in protecting women who breastfeed in public.95  The lack 
of protection after Derungs and before Ohio’s new law demonstrates the 
need for states to adopt express legislation protecting breastfeeding because 
of the possibility of courts to adopt a narrow interpretation of sex 
discrimination statutes. 
Although not specifically addressing breastfeeding, Congress responded 
to the dilemma that the sex-specific characteristic of pregnancy does not fit 
into the traditional Title VII analysis, which requires a comparison between 
men and women, and established pregnancy as a per se basis for 
discrimination.96  Courts have ignored that a plausible and logical 
extension of Congress’s per se ban on pregnancy discrimination as a form 
of sex discrimination is to include breastfeeding discrimination as a form of 
sex discrimination.97
Ohio’s new law, which expressly confers on women an affirmative right 
to breastfeed in places of public accommodation, will at least partially 
correct judicial refusal to extend the logic of protecting pregnancy under 
prohibitions of sex discrimination to breastfeeding.98  In enacting a law that 
clearly and expressly protects public breastfeeding, Ohio is following a 
growing majority of states recognizing this judicially-created sex 
discrimination loophole.99  These states legislated around the breastfeeding 
 93. See, e.g., Wallace v. Pyro Mining Co., 789 F. Supp. 867, 869-70 (W.D. Ky. 1990) 
(holding that the PDA does not protect the act of breastfeeding); Martinez, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 
310-11 (finding that banning the activity of breast pumping does not rise to the level of sex 
discrimination). 
 94. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-948, at 2-3 (arguing that Justice Stevens accurately interpreted 
pregnancy as a basis for sex discrimination in his Gilbert dissent). 
 95. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3781.55 (West 2005) (giving women an affirmative 
right to breastfeed in places of public accommodation). 
 96. See id. at 3 (stating that distinctions based on the ability to become pregnant 
naturally constitute per se violations of Title VII). 
 97. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (prohibiting sex discrimination based on pregnancy and 
other related medical conditions); see also H.R. REP. NO. 95-948, at 5 (stating that the PDA 
is deliberately broad in order to cover all aspects of the childbearing process). 
 98. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3781.55 (West 2005) (Ohio 2005) (prohibiting 
managers and owners of places of public accommodation from restricting or banning public 
breastfeeding). 
 99. E.g., CAL. CIVIL CODE § 43.3 (West 2004) (protecting a mother’s right to breastfeed 
her infant in any place of public accommodation or any other place where the mother has a 
right to be); accord DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 31, § 310 (1997) (permitting mothers to breastfeed 
any place they are permitted to be); HAW. REV. STAT. § 489-21 (2004) (prohibiting 
discrimination against breastfeeding mothers in places of public accommodation); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 26:4B-4 (guaranteeing mothers the right to breastfeed in places of public 
accommodation); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4502(j) (2004) (allowing mothers to breastfeed in 
places of public accommodation); see also DARLEEN CHIEN, UNITED STATES BREASTFEEDING 
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discrimination loophole by using public accommodation statutes.100  Cases 
like Derungs have made it clear that courts render more traditional avenues 
of protection, namely employment and public accommodation 
discrimination claims, useless in protecting public breastfeeding by 
narrowly interpreting sex as a basis for such discrimination.101  Therefore, 
enacting express legislation permitting women to breastfeed in public is 
necessary to protect women from breastfeeding discrimination.102
B.  The Sixth Circuit’s Analysis of Ohio’s Public Accommodation Statute: 
Overruled, Outdated and Out of Place Logic 
1.  The Derungs Court Relied on Unsettled and Distinguishable Authority 
The Derungs holding is crucial because it demonstrates that Title VII 
does not protect a woman’s right to breastfeed and that state public 
accommodation statutes that employ the language and framework of Title 
VII will not adequately protect public breastfeeding.103  In Derungs, the 
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that a Title VII comparability 
analysis was appropriate to examine the discrimination claim under OPAS, 
despite the fact that the Ohio Supreme Court has never ruled on this 
issue.104  The court correctly relied on existing precedent,105 but failed to 
address the possible controversy in applying the comparability analysis.106  
The Sixth Circuit expressly noted that Ohio courts have not fully adopted 
the application of federal Title VII analysis in public accommodation 
claims; however, the court adopted an analysis that the PDA effectively 
COMMITTEE, STATE LEGIS. THAT PROTECTS, PROMOTES, AND SUPPORTS BREASTFEEDING 
(May 25, 2004) [hereinafter STATE LEGIS.] (reporting that currently thirty-six states have 
legislation protecting or promoting breastfeeding). 
 100. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 31, § 310 (adding an express statute protecting a 
mother’s right to breastfeed in any place of public accommodation); id. tit. 6, § 4501 
(prohibiting sex discrimination in places of public accommodation). 
 101. See Derungs, 374 F.3d at 439 (concluding that restrictions on breastfeeding do not 
constitute sex discrimination, therefore statutes prohibiting sex discrimination in places of 
public accommodation do not protect against such restrictions). 
 102. E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3781.55 (West 2005) (allowing mothers to breastfeed 
their children in public). 
 103. See id. 
 104. See Derungs, 374 F.3d at 434 (stating that Title VII comparability analysis is an 
appropriate framework, despite the fact that Ohio courts have not determined whether Title 
VII applies to OPAS). 
 105. See Lawler, 322 F.3d at 903 (asserting that when a state supreme court has not ruled 
on an issue, courts should follow the precedent of intermediate courts). 
 106. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (obviating the necessity of the comparability analysis by 
stating that discrimination based on pregnancy, childbirth and related conditions is per se 
sex discrimination under Title VII); see also Diana Kasdan, Note, Reclaiming Title VII and 
the PDA: Prohibiting Workplace Discrimination Against Breastfeeding Women, 76 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 309, 338 (2001) (arguing that the comparability analysis is inappropriate in 
examining breastfeeding claims because it wrongly draws a distinction between pregnant 
and non-pregnant persons, rather than between men and women). 
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nullified, at least in examining pregnancy insurance benefits.107
In Derungs, the court examined one Ohio Supreme Court case and a 
number of Ohio intermediate court cases involving race and sex 
discrimination in order to demonstrate the applicability of the 
comparability analysis to OPAS.108  The court relied on Lysyj, Gegner v. 
Graham and Meyers to justify the use of comparability analysis in OPAS, 
but failed to distinguish these cases from the unique issue presented in 
pregnancy and breastfeeding claims.109  Furthermore, only Meyers, a sex 
discrimination case, even mentioned the need to define a comparable 
class.110
The basic test the courts used in these cases was a simple reiteration of 
the plain language of the statute.111  The Meyers decision, however, further 
defined this test by using the comparability analysis.112  In Meyers, the 
court found no violation of OPAS by comparing the store’s treatment of 
women to its treatment of men.113  Although the Meyers court employed 
the comparability analysis based on a linguistic interpretation of OPAS, 
 107. See Derungs, 374 F.3d at 434 (stating that Ohio courts use federal law in 
employment claims, but admitting that Ohio courts have not settled on the use of that 
framework for OPAS).  The precedent of Ohio’s intermediate courts is controlling absent a 
showing that the Ohio Supreme Court would have decided the issue differently; however, 
the court failed to address the departure of an Ohio intermediate court in Meyers, from the 
Ohio Supreme Court’s interpretation of the plain language interpretation of the statute in 
Lysyj.  Id. at 433-434. 
 108. See id. at 433 (implying that existing precedent from the Ohio Supreme Court and 
state intermediate courts support the use of the comparability analysis in interpreting 
OPAS); see also Lysyj, 313 N.E.2d at 5-6 (addressing race discrimination under OPAS); 
Meyers, 721 N.E.2d at 1083-84 (considering sex discrimination under OPAS); Gegner v. 
Graham, 205 N.E.2d 69, 70-71 (Ohio Ct. App. 1964) (examining race discrimination under 
OPAS). 
 109. See Derungs, 374 F.3d at 433-34 (finding that Lysyj, Meyers and Gegner support 
the use of the comparability analysis and are controlling because they are the only cases to 
interpret discrimination claims under OPAS); Lysyj, 313 N.E.2d at 5-6 (analyzing whether a 
trailer park owner discriminated against a woman based on her race and stating that the test 
for discrimination is whether the owner discriminated “except for reasons applicable alike” 
to all); Meyers, 721 N.E.2d at 1082-83 (considering whether the owner of a bagel shop 
discriminated against a female customer when he harassed her, by comparing how the 
owner treated male customers and employees to how he treated the female customer); 
Gegner, 205 N.E.2d at 70-71 (employing the Lysyj test to determine whether a barbershop 
owner violated OPAS by refusing to cut a black patron’s hair). 
 110. See Meyers, 721 N.E.2d at 1082-83 (stating that the “thrust of the statute, by its 
terms, is the comparability of treatment” and comparing the treatment of the female plaintiff 
with the treatment of male customers and employees). 
 111. See Lysyj, 313 N.E.2d at 8 (clarifying that “the test is simply whether the proprietor 
. . . denied to any person the full enjoyment of such place for reasons not applicable alike to 
all persons. . . .”); Meyers, 721 N.E.2d at 1082 (stating that “[a]ny denial of enjoyment of 
services must be applicable to all persons”). 
 112. See Meyers, 721 N.E.2d at 1082 (stating that OPAS’s language implies the need for 
the comparability analysis). 
 113. See id. at 1083 (stating that the storeowner’s hostility and aggression was not 
limited to females but extended to male customers and employees as well).  Therefore, sex 
did not motivate the owner to harass customers.  Id. 
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neither Lysyj nor Meyers mentioned the federal Title VII analysis.114  The 
fact that neither case mentions Title VII analysis weakens the 
persuasiveness of the Sixth Circuit’s use of the federal framework in 
interpreting OPAS.115  The Sixth Circuit adopted a framework for analysis 
that neither the Ohio legislature nor Ohio courts expressly accepted and 
that Congress rejected in the federal context.116  This framework will likely 
be adopted by other courts, as well, thereby failing to protect a woman’s 
desire to breastfeed in public. 
The Derungs court’s use of Lysyj and Gegner is particularly 
unpersuasive because both cases dealt with race discrimination, not sex 
discrimination, and neither case spoke of comparability analysis.117  In 
Lysyj, the court did not compare the plaintiff’s race to other residents.118  
The Derungs court interpreted this case by stating that the discrimination 
was based on the fact that the owner did not prohibit the resident from 
entertaining white guests, but black guests only.119  However, the Lysyj 
court did not use the comparability analysis and still found that the 
woman’s race was the motivating factor in the owner’s action.120
If the Lysyj court actually applied the comparability analysis as the 
Derungs court suggested, it is possible that the outcome would have been 
different.  Similar to the district court’s reasoning in Derungs, the court, 
using comparability analysis, might have found that the trailer park owner 
did not discriminate against all white residents as compared with black 
residents, but rather a subgroup of white residents who entertained black 
guests.121  Therefore, the owner did not discriminate against the resident 
 114. See id. at 1082 (stating that the “thrust” of OPAS, based on the terms it employs, is 
comparability ); Lysyj, 313 N.E.2d at 6 (stating that the test for discrimination is a simple 
reiteration of OPAS). 
 115. See Derungs, 374 F.3d at 437-38 (employing a Title VII comparability analysis and 
reasoning that Ohio courts apply this analysis in deciding OPAS claims but only citing 
Lysyj, Gegner and Meyers as support for this conclusion). 
 116. See id. at 434 (acknowledging that the use of the federal framework “has not been 
definitively settled by the Ohio courts in the context of discrimination in places of public 
accommodation”). 
 117. See Lysyj, 313 N.E.2d at 6 (stating that determining unlawful discrimination 
requires “simply” applying the plain language of the statute); Gegner, 205 N.E.2d at 72 
(reiterating the language of the statute as the test for discrimination and making no mention 
of comparison other than limiting practices “for reasons applicable alike” to all). 
 118. See Lysyj, 313 N.E.2d at 6 (finding that the owner discriminated against the woman 
not because of her race as compared to other residents but because of her race coupled with 
the race of her guests). 
 119. See Derungs, 374 F.3d at 433 (concluding that in Lysyj, the owner’s denial of 
service to the woman did not occur when she entertained white guests, but only occurred 
after she entertained black guests). 
 120. See Lysyj, 313 N.E.2d at 6 (stating that although the plaintiff’s race alone was not 
the basis for discrimination, the owner discriminated based on the fact that a white woman 
entertained black guests, thus race was a “principal motivation” for his actions). 
 121. See Derungs, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 893 (holding that discrimination against a 
protected subclass may be lawful).  The actions are unlawful if there is evidence, through 
comparison of a similar subclass, that the discrimination is in fact based on the larger class’s 
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because she was a white person, but because of her specific conduct—
entertaining black guests.122  The Lysyj court, however, did not employ the 
comparability analysis, but followed a simple reading of OPAS to find that 
the owner discriminated against the woman because of her race.123
The Sixth Circuit applied the comparability analysis despite the fact that 
the cases that invoke comparability analysis under OPAS are factually 
distinguishable from Derungs; not one of the cases examined breastfeeding 
or pregnancy as a basis of sex discrimination.124  Although the Meyers 
opinion decided a claim of discrimination based on sex, the case did not 
provide an accurate basis for interpreting a claim of breastfeeding 
discrimination.125  Comparability analysis was appropriate in Meyers, 
where a class of comparable men was at least plausible.126  Using the 
Meyers rationale in a breastfeeding case ignores the problem the PDA 
sought to correct for pregnancy: the biological impossibility of a class of 
comparable pregnant or breastfeeding men.127  A federal Title VII analysis 
requires interpretation of the PDA, rather than a comparison of women to a 
class of similarly situated males.128  By treating discrimination based on 
pregnancy as a per se violation, the PDA recognizes and rectifies the 
problem presented by the impossibility of finding a comparable group of 
pregnant or breastfeeding men.129
2.  The Derungs Court’s Application of Employment Analysis to Ohio’s 
Public Accommodation Statute Failed to Address Alternative Sources of 
protected status rather than the qualification that divides the subclass from the larger 
protected class.  Id. 
 122. See Lysyj, 313 N.E.2d at 6 (stating that the test for discrimination is a plain reading 
of the statute and making no mention of comparability or reference to a comparable class of 
trailer park residents). 
 123. See id. (holding that the owner’s discrimination was motivated in part by the 
woman’s race). 
 124. See, e.g., Meyers, 721 N.E.2d at 1082-83 (examining whether verbal harassment 
against a female customer constituted discrimination based on sex). 
 125. See id. (interpreting OPAS’s prohibition of discrimination based on sex).  But see 
Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: The Case of Pregnancy, in FEMINIST 
JURISPRUDENCE 27, 39-40 (Patricia Smith ed., 1993) (arguing that after the PDA, Title VII 
analysis in pregnancy claims will be distinct from other Title VII claims using the 
comparability analysis, because discrimination based on pregnancy per se discriminates 
against a woman based on of her sex and because of the biological impossibility of requiring 
a comparable class or pregnant males). 
 126. See Meyers, 721 N.E.2d at 1083 (reasoning that because the storeowner also 
harassed male customers and employees, his harassment of a female customer was not 
motivated by her sex). 
 127. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-948, at 2-3 (recognizing that pregnancy is confined to females 
and concluding that the PDA eliminates the need of Satty’s impact approach or Gilbert’s 
comparability approach, which require courts to compare the employment practice’s impact 
on women to its impact on men). 
 128. See id. (stating that under the PDA, distinctions based on pregnancy are per se 
violations of Title VII). 
 129. See id. (explaining that the PDA repudiates the analysis that the Supreme Court 
used in Gilbert). 
21
Whelan: For Crying Out Loud: Ohio's Legal Battle With Public Breastfeedin
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2005
690 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW  [Vol. 13:3 
                                                          
Comparison 
The Sixth Circuit’s use of Title VII employment analysis failed to 
acknowledge the breadth of the statutory language of OPAS as compared to 
Title II, the federal public accommodation antidiscrimination statute, which 
applies to a limited group of protected classes.130  The court could have 
compared OPAS to Title II, because both protect against discrimination in 
places of public accommodation.131  Under this analysis, the court could 
have inferred that the addition of sex as a possible source of discrimination 
under OPAS, when compared to the federal Title II framework, was at least 
potentially indicative of Ohio’s intent to provide broader protection for sex 
discrimination than federal law.132
Because the Derungs court employed a federal framework to OPAS, it is 
useful to examine the federal public accommodation statute.133  Under the 
federal Civil Rights Act of 1964, separate titles govern protections from 
discrimination based on status or characteristics such as race, religion, sex 
or national origin in places of public accommodation and in the 
employment context.134  Title II restricts discrimination based only on the 
ground of race, color, religion, or national origin.135  In fact, Title II federal 
public accommodation protections under the Civil Rights Act do not list 
sex as a prohibited basis for discriminatory treatment.136
In contrast to the federal protections for employment discrimination and 
discrimination in places of public accommodation, Ohio’s Civil Rights Act 
combines both contexts and prohibits employers, labor organizations, 
owners of places of public accommodation, real estate agents and 
landowners from discrimination against individuals under one section of 
 130. Compare OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02(G) (including sex as a characteristic 
basis for discrimination in places of public accommodation), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000a 
(excluding sex as a characteristic basis for discrimination in places of public 
accommodation). 
 131. Compare OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02(G) (prohibiting discrimination in places 
of public accommodation), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (prohibiting discrimination in places of 
public accommodation). 
 132. See, e.g., Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 624 (1984) (indicating that 
Minnesota, like many other states, included sex in their public accommodation statutes in 
order to provide broader protections than its federal counterpart). 
 133. See Derungs, 374 F.3d at 434 (stating that Ohio courts use a Title VII analysis in 
determining employment discrimination claims under OPAS); see also OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. §§ 4112.02(A)-(H) (demonstrating that unlike the federal public accommodation 
statute, the Ohio legislature did not list OPAS as a separate section, but rather placed the 
provision among the employment discrimination sections of Ohio’s Civil Rights Act). 
 134. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (prohibiting discrimination in places of public 
accommodation), with Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. §2000e 
(2000) (prohibiting discriminatory employment practice). 
 135. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (excluding sex as a characteristic for public accommodation 
discrimination claims). 
 136. See id. (prohibiting discrimination “on the ground of” race, color, religion, and 
national origin). 
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unlawful discriminatory practices.137  Each of these sections lists the same 
basic set of protected categories, including race, color, religion, national 
origin, disability, age, ancestry and sex.138
The Sixth Circuit could have concluded that the inclusion of sex as a 
protected category in OPAS indicates the state’s intent to broaden the 
federal public accommodation framework.  Title II does not compel 
protection against discrimination based on sex in places of public 
accommodations, but states are free to prohibit such discrimination through 
legislation.139  On its face, OPAS provides a broader protection of 
prohibited discriminatory acts than Title II, including discrimination based 
on sex.140  In comparison, Title VII provides a broader set of protected 
groups than Title II’s protections against discrimination in places of public 
accommodation, because Title VII expressly prohibits sex discrimination as 
an unlawful practice.141  OPAS similarly includes a broad class of grounds 
for discrimination, including sex.142
The Sixth Circuit accepted the district court’s conclusion that the Title 
VII comparability analysis is appropriate in analyzing OPAS by 
interpreting the language of the statute as implying a linguistic necessity for 
comparison.143  While most of Ohio’s Civil Rights Act adopted the classic 
Title VII language “because of” or on the “basis of” sex, OPAS uses the 
phrase “for reasons applicable alike regardless of” sex.144  The Derungs 
 137. See OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. §§ 4112.02(A)-(H) (prohibiting various discriminatory 
employment practices, discriminatory housing practices and discrimination in places of 
public accommodation). 
 138. See id. §§ 4112.02(A)-(C), (E)-(G) (listing the same group of protected 
characteristics as race, color, religion, sex, national origin, disability, age and ancestry).  But 
see id. § 4112.02(D) (omitting age from the list of characteristics); id. § 4112.02(H) (naming 
the same group of characteristics and adding familial status). 
 139. See, e.g., Roberts, 468 U.S. at 624-25 (upholding Minnesota’s Public 
Accommodation statute, which includes sex, although the addition broadened the scope of 
protection provided by Title II). 
 140. Compare OHIO REV. CODE ANN. at § 4112.02(G) (prohibiting discrimination 
“except for reasons applicable alike to all persons regardless of race, color, religion, sex, 
national origin, disability, age or ancestry”), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (extending protection 
only to discrimination “on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin”). 
 141. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (prohibiting discrimination “on the ground of race, 
color, religion or national origin”), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (prohibiting discriminatory 
practice “because of” sex, race, color, religion or national origin). 
 142. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02(G) (prohibiting discrimination, regardless of 
sex, in places of public accommodation “except for reasons applicable alike”). 
 143. See Derungs, 374 F.3d at 437 (stating that the statute’s use of the language “reasons 
applicable alike” compels a comparison between groups to establish discrimination); 
Derungs, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 891-92 (concluding that there is no reason to distinguish 
between the analysis necessary to determine discrimination based on sex under OPAS and 
discrimination based on sex under the Title VII analysis).  But see OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
4112.02(A) (stating that employers may not discriminate “because of . . . sex,” thus 
invoking Title VII analysis as defined by the PDA); cf. id. § 4112.02(G) (using the language 
“reasons applicable alike to all persons regardless” of sex and failing to incorporate Title 
VII’s language). 
 144. Compare OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02(A) (adopting the language of the PDA 
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court acknowledged the difference in language between OPAS and the rest 
of Ohio’s Civil Rights Act, stating that the linguistic difference 
strengthened the logic behind applying Title VII comparability analysis.145  
However, the Derungs court could have concluded that the language 
indicates intent to use a distinct analysis, rather than employing Title VII’s 
basic framework. 
3.  The Derungs Court Followed an Overruled and Flawed Federal 
Framework 
The Supreme Court accepted the PDA’s assertion that pregnancy 
discrimination is discrimination per se and affirmed the inapplicability of 
comparability analysis for claims of discrimination based on pregnancy.  
However, federal courts have been unwilling to extend the PDA’s logic to 
include breastfeeding discrimination, like pregnancy discrimination, in the 
definition of discrimination based on sex.146  Instead, the federal courts that 
have examined these claims have resurrected the Gilbert analysis and 
found that practices that fail to protect breastfeeding do not discriminate 
based on sex.147  Derungs followed this flawed framework for 
breastfeeding discrimination, and other courts may as well, in states that 
currently lack protection for breastfeeding women.148
In an employment context, discrimination or distinctions based on 
pregnancy form a basis for a valid sex discrimination claim.149  However, 
lower courts have not extended this reasoning to prohibit employment 
discrimination based on a woman’s breastfeeding.150  Consequently, the 
and prohibiting employers from discriminating based on sex), and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) 
(defining the terms “because of sex” and “on the basis of sex” for employment 
discrimination purposes), with OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02(G) (prohibiting 
discrimination in places of public accommodation). 
 145. See Derungs, 374 F.3d at 437 (reasoning that the distinct language used in OPAS, 
as compared with the other provisions of the Civil Rights law, implies a need for the 
comparability analysis to find a violation). 
 146. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (redefining the terms “because of” or “on the basis of” 
sex to include pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions); see also Newport News, 
462 U.S. at 678 (holding that distinctions based on pregnancy constitute sex discrimination 
under the PDA).  But see, e.g., Barrash v. Bowen, 846 F.2d 927, 931-32 (4th Cir. 1988) (per 
curiam) (holding that breastfeeding discrimination claims are not valid bases for sex 
discrimination under Title VII). 
 147. See, e.g., Wallace, 789 F. Supp. at 867, 869 (reasoning that a distinction drawn at 
breastfeeding is not a distinction drawn at sex).  But cf. H.R. REP. NO. 95-948, at 5 (asserting 
that the PDA’s broad language clearly extends protection to “the whole range of matters 
concerning the childbearing process”). 
 148. See Derungs, 374 F.3d at 438 (following federal cases, which resurrected the pre-
PDA Gilbert analysis as the standard for breastfeeding discrimination claims); see also 
Candace Saari Kovacic-Fleischer, Litigating Against Employment Penalites For Pregnancy, 
Breastfeeding and Childcare, 44 VILL. L. REV. 355, 381 (1999) (stating that continuing to 
use Gilbert logic ignores Congress’s intent to overrule Gilbert’s holding and reasoning). 
 149. See Newport News, 462 U.S. at 678-82 (explaining that, as a result of the PDA, 
Title VII protects pregnant women from sex discrimination in an employment context). 
 150. See, e.g., Wallace, 789 F. Supp. at 869 (holding that Title VII does not include 
24
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 13, Iss. 3 [2005], Art. 5
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol13/iss3/5
2005] FOR CRYING OUT LOUD 693 
                                                          
Sixth Circuit in Derungs was unwilling to conclude that OPAS intended to 
prohibit restrictions on breastfeeding simply by prohibiting sex 
discrimination.151  Lower courts resurrected the Gilbert comparability 
analysis in examining breastfeeding discrimination claims,152 despite the 
Supreme Court’s recognition that the PDA overruled Gilbert’s holding.153
While the Court in Newport News held that the specific challenged 
practice constituted discrimination based on sex, it did not expressly define 
the scope of pregnancy discrimination under Title VII.154  This judicial 
oversight led most federal courts to conclude that limitations on public 
breastfeeding and an employer’s lack of accommodation for breastfeeding 
are not forms of sex-based discrimination under Title VII.155  Specifically, 
the Fourth Circuit led this trend of ignoring the PDA in assessing the 
claims of breastfeeding discrimination in Barrash v. Bowen.156
In Barrash, an employer denied a female employee’s request for six 
months unpaid leave in order to breastfeed her child.157 The Fourth Circuit 
failed to embrace the breadth of the PDA’s language and extend the logic 
to distinctions based on breastfeeding.158  Instead, the court held that the 
PDA did not cover discrimination based on breastfeeding.159  
Consequently, the unwillingness of the court to extend the logic of the PDA 
breastfeeding as a basis for sex discrimination). 
 151. See Derungs, 374 F.3d at 429 (holding that OPAS’s prohibition of sex 
discrimination does not include breastfeeding discrimination). 
 152. See, e.g., Martinez, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 309 (expressly invoking Gilbert as the 
appropriate analysis); see also Kasdan, supra note 106, at 337-38 (arguing that courts have 
no rational basis for excluding breastfeeding from pregnancy discrimination claims as a 
bright line rule, given broad scope of the PDA,). 
 153. See Newport News, 462 U.S. at 676 (expressly overruling the holding and reasoning 
of Gilbert). 
 154. See id. at 678 (holding only that the specific insurance plan, which did not give 
equal pregnancy benefits to the spouses of male employees as it did to female employees, 
constituted discrimination). 
 155. See Wallace, 789 F. Supp. at 869-70 (holding that breastfeeding is not a medical 
condition related to pregnancy and, therefore, not a form of pregnancy or sex discrimination 
under the PDA); see also Kasdan, supra note 106, at 309-13, 324 (arguing that courts drew 
a distinction between sex-based discrimination and discrimination based on breastfeeding 
and applied the logic of Gilbert, rather than the intent of the PDA, to exclude breastfeeding 
from Title VII protection); Kovacic-Fleischer, supra note 148, at 377 (asserting that the 
courts denied extending the PDA to breastfeeding by comparing “gender specific 
breastfeeding to sex neutral childrearing . . . .”). 
 156. See 846 F.2d at 928 (considering whether the Social Security Administration 
discriminated against an employee because of her sex in denying her request for six months 
maternity leave without pay so that she could breastfeed her child). 
 157. See id. (noting that an employer granted an employee a six-month leave for the birth 
of her first child, but after the employer changed policies regarding pay without leave, the 
employer denied the same employee another six-month leave for her second child). 
 158. See Kasdan, supra note 106, at 338-40 (arguing that courts should recognize 
breastfeeding as a possible source of sex discrimination under the intended broad scope of 
the PDA to ensure that employers do not discriminate against women). 
 159. See Barrash, 846 F.2d at 931 (stating that the PDA only covered “incapacitating” 
conditions). 
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to claims of breastfeeding paved the road for two district courts to resurrect 
the logic of Gilbert in analyzing claims of breastfeeding discrimination.160
Following a trend of relying on overruled logic, a Kentucky district court 
cited and followed the Gilbert analysis in examining a claim of 
breastfeeding discrimination in Wallace v. Pyro Mining.161  In Wallace, an 
employee alleged that her employer’s denial of permission for personal 
leave so that she could wean her child from breastfeeding violated the 
PDA.162  First, the court examined the claim under a Gilbert analysis, yet 
interestingly linked breastfeeding to pregnancy, giving false hope that the 
court might recognize the need to analyze breastfeeding under the PDA.163  
The court even acknowledged the impact of the PDA on pregnancy claims, 
but then narrowly interpreted the PDA by confining the analysis to 
breastfeeding as a medical condition.164  Citing Barrash’s requirement of 
incapacitation, the court dismissed the claim that breastfeeding was a type 
of medical condition protected by the PDA.165
In Martinez v. NBC, the court neglected to reference the PDA at all.166  
Instead, the court focused on the Gilbert analysis and held that the 
employer did not treat the plaintiff any differently than a “similarly 
situated” man.167  While the PDA does not expressly mention breastfeeding 
as a protected act, the court’s reasoning is unpersuasive because it fails to 
recognize that this comparability analysis, at least in terms of analyzing 
pregnancy, is exactly the sex discrimination analysis the PDA abolished.168
These lower court cases establish a framework for analysis of 
breastfeeding discrimination claims that ignores the logic of the PDA.169  
 160. See Wallace, 789 F. Supp. at 869 (citing Gilbert as controlling precedent); accord 
Martinez, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 309 (stating that Gilbert established the basic framework for 
discrimination claims under Title VII and holding that treating breastfeeding women 
differently is not prohibited under the Gilbert analysis). 
 161. See 789 F. Supp. at 868-69 (holding that an employer’s refusal of an additional 
leave of absence so that an employee could breastfeed her child did not constitute sex 
discrimination).  The court invoked Gilbert’s conclusion that if the plan did not confer 
pregnancy benefits on either sex, it automatically treated men and women equally.  Id. 
 162. See id. at 868 (stating that the plaintiff requested an additional six weeks of personal 
leave because her child rejected all forms of food but breast milk). 
 163. See id. at 869 (acknowledging that, like pregnancy, only women can breastfeed, and 
breastfeeding is naturally and necessarily linked to pregnancy). 
 164. See id. (stating that the PDA protects medical conditions related to pregnancy, but 
nevertheless does not define these conditions). 
 165. See id. at 870 (stating that under Barrash, the PDA protects only incapacitating 
medical conditions related to pregnancy). 
 166. See 49 F. Supp. 2d at 309-11 (holding that NBC’s failure to provide one of its 
female employees with an adequately safe and private area to pump breast milk was not 
discrimination based on sex under Title VII). 
 167. See id. at 309, 311 (stating that breastfeeding, unlike pregnancy, is not a protected 
basis for sex discrimination under the PDA, so the Gilbert analysis applies). 
 168. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-948, at 3-4 (stating that the PDA considers pregnancy 
discrimination a per se violation of Title VII by treating distinctions based on pregnancy the 
same as other sex-based distinctions). 
 169. Compare Wallace, 789 F. Supp. at 869 (distinguishing breastfeeding as a medical 
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The cases applied the analysis of a case that the Supreme Court has 
specifically overruled.170  Their application to OPAS is therefore 
unpersuasive and illogical.171
Additionally, these cases ignore the plain language of the PDA by 
disregarding the “not limited to” clause.172  This clause is a strong 
indication that Congress intended the PDA to provide broad protections 
against various practices surrounding pregnancy, not limiting protection to 
the confined state of pregnancy and act of childbirth.173  Had Congress 
intended to limit the statute specifically to pregnancy, childbirth, and 
related medical conditions, arguably Congress would have omitted the “not 
limited to” clause.174  Ignoring the plain language of the statute not only 
misinterprets the statute itself, but also ignores the underlying intent of the 
statute: protecting women against various forms of discrimination in the 
workplace.175  As long as courts continue to narrowly interpret sex 
discrimination claims and exclude breastfeeding from protection under the 
PDA, as the Sixth Circuit reasoned in Derungs, states must expressly enact 
express legislation to adequately protect public breastfeeding. 
C.  Breastfeeding is a Sex-Specific Act and the Derungs Holding 
Discriminates against Women 
1.  The Derungs Court Made Implausible Sex-Neutral Comparisons 
Through its use of the comparability analysis, the court in Derungs not 
condition and asserting that since it is not an incapacitating condition, analysis under the 
PDA was inappropriate), with H.R. REP. NO. 95-948, at 4 (stating that “pregnancy-based 
distinctions will be subject to the same scrutiny on the same terms as other acts of sex 
discrimination proscribed in the existing statute”), and id. at 5 (stating that the statute is 
deliberately broad to include all stages of the childbearing process). 
 170. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (defining the terms involving sex discrimination to 
include pregnancy); Newport News, 462 U.S. at 676, 678 (arguing that Congress, through 
the PDA, overturned the specific holding in Gilbert). 
 171. See Derungs, 374 F.3d at 438 (following federal cases, which use a Gilbert 
analysis, as the standard for breastfeeding discrimination claims); Newport News, 462 U.S. 
at 676, 678 (holding that the PDA overturned the holding and reasoning of Gilbert). 
 172. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (defining “because of sex” and “on the basis of sex” by 
stating that the terms “include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of 
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions”). 
 173. See Kovacic-Fleischer, supra note 148, at 377 (asserting that no court has 
interpreted the “not limited to” clause of the PDA). 
 174. See id. at 382 (arguing that courts have concluded that breastfeeding is not 
“pregnancy, childbirth, or a medical condition related to pregnancy” and ignored the “plain 
language” of the PDA, which states that discrimination may not be limited to these factors); 
see also H.R. REP. NO. 95-948, at 7 (stating intended exclusions of certain applications of 
the PDA, but not expressly excluding breastfeeding).  The House Report specifically 
addressed the concern that potential plaintiffs would use the PDA to force employers to pay 
for abortions and stated that the statute expressly limits this application.  Id. 
 175. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-948, at 5 (stating that the PDA’s broad use of language makes 
it clear that the statute intended to extend to a range of issues concerning pregnancy and 
childbearing). 
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only ignored the Supreme Court’s acknowledgement that the PDA 
overruled Gilbert in Newport News, but also ignored the fact that 
breastfeeding is biologically a sex-specific act.176  While states may protect 
public breastfeeding by enacting legislation like Ohio’s new law, decisions 
like the Sixth Circuit’s holding in Derungs are important for states to note 
so that they may design legislation that does not rely on traditional sex 
discrimination frameworks for protection of breastfeeding.177  The court’s 
analysis requires a comparison of treatment to a subclass of men that 
cannot biologically exist.178  This analysis not only relies on overruled 
rationale and logic as discussed earlier, but fails to recognize the sex-
specific nature of pregnancy and extend that logic to the similarly sex-
specific act of breastfeeding.179  The court cited Barrash, Martinez and 
Wallace as examples of other instances where comparability analysis was 
appropriate in breastfeeding claims.180  The court dismissed a claim of sex-
plus discrimination for lacking a comparable subclass of men, rather than 
explain the inapplicability of sex-plus discrimination claims to 
breastfeeding discrimination.181  These conclusions fail to acknowledge the 
unique issue presented by the sex-specific nature of breastfeeding, similar 
to pregnancy, and its impact on women in the workplace.182
Using a sex-neutral comparability analysis in breastfeeding, as in 
pregnancy employment cases, for example, could potentially allow 
employers to discriminate based on a characteristic that only women 
possess as a pretext for discrimination based on their sex.183  Congress and 
 176. See Shana M. Christrup, Breastfeeding in the American Workplace, 9 AM. U. J. 
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 471, 485-86 (2001) (asserting that ignoring the sex-specific nature 
of breastfeeding results in inequality of the treatment of men and women in the workplace). 
 177. See, e.g., Derungs, 374 F.3d at 437 (holding that OPAS, which prohibits sex 
discrimination, does not protect against discrimination against breastfeeding women). 
 178. See id. (requiring a comparison between the manner in which Wal-Mart treated 
breastfeeding women and the manner in which it treated men). 
 179. See Kovacic-Fleischer, supra note 148, at 377-80 (comparing sex-specific 
breastfeeding to sex-specific pregnancy); see also Kay, supra note 125, at 39-40 (asserting 
that cases like Geduldig, which do not recognize the biological and reproductive differences 
between men and women, perpetuate inequality between the sexes). 
 180. See Derungs, 374 F.3d at 438-39 (stating that other breastfeeding cases have 
“universally accepted” the use of the comparability analysis and citing Wallace, Martinez 
and Barrash as examples of controlling precedent). 
 181. See id. at 439 (stating that a sex-plus claim fails for lack of a comparable subclass 
of men); see also Martin Marietta, 400 U.S. at 544 (holding that an employer’s refusal to 
hire women with pre-school age children but not similarly-situated men violated Title VII as 
sex discrimination even though the characteristic that served as the distinction, having pre-
school age children, was sex-neutral); see also Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the 
Maternal Wall: Relief for Family Caregivers Who are Discriminated Against on the Job, 26 
HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 77, 124 (2003) (arguing that the sex-plus analysis that the Supreme 
Court established in Martin Marietta required a sex-neutral characteristic as the “plus” 
factor). 
 182. See Kovacic-Fleischer, supra note 148, at 355 (asserting that breastfeeding, like 
pregnancy, is exclusive to women and influences their function as employees and decision 
to work). 
 183. See, e.g., Martinez, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 311 (finding that “tasteless and offensive” 
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the Supreme Court eradicated this problem for pregnancy, at least in the 
employment context, through the PDA.184  This logic extends naturally to 
breastfeeding because, like pregnancy, breastfeeding is sex-specific to 
women.185  For these reasons, the Derungs court applied a faulty and 
outdated logic in using a Title VII analysis.186
The Derungs court also misinterpreted the applicability of sex-plus 
discrimination in analyzing breastfeeding discrimination claims by 
essentially using the same test it would apply in any sex discrimination 
claim and requiring a comparable class of men.187  The court ignored the 
fact that sex-plus claims are inapplicable because these claims deal with a 
distinction based on sex coupled with a sex-neutral characteristic, which 
serves as a pretext for the underlying sex discrimination.188  However, 
breastfeeding is not a sex-neutral characteristic, like parenting a school-
aged child.189  Therefore, the reasoning the court followed in dismissing the 
claim because of the lack of a comparable subclass ignored the underlying 
problem of applying traditional Title VII analysis to pregnancy and 
breastfeeding claims.190  The Derungs court’s comparison of the plaintiff’s 
claim to the Martinez sex-plus analysis does not fail because of the lack of 
a comparable class, but is completely inappropriate in its application 
because the “plus” characteristic is sex-specific rather than sex-neutral.191  
remarks directed towards an employee pumping breast milk did not constitute sex 
discrimination). 
 184. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (defining the terms “because of sex” and “on the basis of 
sex” to include pregnancy); Newport News, 462 U.S. at 684 (stating the PDA necessitates a 
finding that distinctions based on pregnancy equal distinctions based on sex and, therefore, 
violate Title VII). 
 185. See Christrup, supra note 176, at 485-86 (arguing that the reasoning courts employ 
to find that distinctions based on breastfeeding do not amount to discrimination against 
women, like distinctions based on pregnancy, ignores the sex-specific nature of 
breastfeeding). 
 186. See Kovacic-Fleischer, supra note 148, at 381 (asserting that because Congress 
overruled the Gilbert logic, it did not intend for courts to revive the logic in similar cases). 
 187. See Derungs, 374 F.3d at 438-39 (comparing the plaintiff’s claim to the 
breastfeeding sex-plus claim asserted in Martinez and concluding that sex-plus analysis 
would still require a corresponding subclass of similarly situated men). 
 188. See Martin Marietta, 400 U.S. at 544 (holding that an employer’s practice of 
refusing to hire women with preschool-age children was discriminatory because no similar 
sex-neutral hiring requirement existed for men who had preschool-age children); see also 
Williams & Segal, supra note 181, at 124 (asserting that sex-plus discrimination occurs 
when an employer treats an employee differently because of sex, in addition to some neutral 
characteristic). 
 189. See Kovacic-Fleischer, supra note 148, at 380 (asserting that breastfeeding is not 
sex-neutral, like childrearing, but rather stems from biological and reproductive differences 
between men and women). 
 190. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-948, at 2-3 (recognizing that the PDA obviates the need for 
comparison between men and women based on recognition that pregnancy is confined to 
women). 
 191. See Williams & Segal, supra note 181, at 124-27 (citing a number of cases that 
correctly use sex-plus discrimination claims where the “plus” characteristic is sex-neutral, 
such as parenting children).  Compare Derungs, 374 F.3d at 439 (classifying the choice to 
breastfeed as a “plus” characteristic), with Martin Marietta, 400 U.S. at 544 (classifying 
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The court should have ignored the traditional analysis and, instead, have 
embraced and extended the logic of the PDA to breastfeeding.192
2.  Treating Breastfeeding as a Choice Ignores Its Sex-Specific Nature 
The difficulty many courts face in translating traditional sex 
discrimination analysis to pregnancy and breastfeeding discrimination 
arises from the fact that not all women will become pregnant or 
breastfeed.193  In this way, the distinction the courts often draw is that 
breastfeeding is not directly the result of being a woman, but rather a 
choice a woman makes.194  Courts find this problem even more critical in 
breastfeeding claims as they view a more attenuated link between sex and 
the act of breastfeeding.195  The subgroups become smaller, resulting in a 
group of women who can or will become pregnant, and an even smaller 
subset of those women, namely those who choose or will be able to 
breastfeed.196  The Derungs court found this division exceptionally 
compelling.197
In pregnancy or breastfeeding discrimination claims, the characteristic 
that makes women different is their status as pregnant or breastfeeding 
women, which is not mentioned anywhere in the pre-PDA version of Title 
VII.198  As a result, the PDA effectively redefined sex to include a 
subgroup of distinctions or classes based on sex.199  Arguably, courts could 
apply the new definition of sex to include pregnancy as a distinction based 
on sex, making comparability analysis workable in pregnancy 
discrimination claims.200  However, this interpretation does not provide a 
parenting a school-age child as the “plus” characteristic). 
 192. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (stating that discrimination “based on sex” or “because of 
sex” includes discrimination because of pregnancy); H.R. REP. NO. 95-948, at 3-4 (stating 
that discrimination based on pregnancy is per se sex discrimination under Title VII). 
 193. See, e.g., Derungs, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 889 (stating that Wal-Mart’s breastfeeding 
restriction affects only women who choose to breastfeed). 
 194. See Barrash, 846 F.2d. at 931-32 (stating that breastfeeding is not an incapacitating 
medical condition but rather results from a mother’s wish to nurse her child). 
 195. See Derungs, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 890 (defining the groups resulting from Wal-
Mart’s restriction on breastfeeding as (1) women who breastfeed and their infants, and (2) 
individuals who do not breastfeed or are not breastfed). 
 196. See id. at 893 (stating that Wal-Mart may discriminate against the protected 
subclass of women who choose to breastfeed, unless the women can prove Wal-Mart's 
discrimination by comparing themselves to a comparable subclass of men). 
 197. See id. (dismissing the plaintiff’s claim that the court’s analysis should not require a 
plaintiff to show that the employer’s practice discriminated against all women, but rather 
that the employer’s practice discriminated against some women who wished to engage in 
breastfeeding, because such an assertion “misses the point”). 
 198. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (prohibiting employers from discriminating against 
employees on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin). 
 199. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (defining distinctions “based on sex” to include 
pregnancy). 
 200. See Kay, supra note 125, at 30 (asserting that Justice Stevens’s dissent in Gilbert 
provides a possible, although not sufficient, solution to the lack of a comparable class of 
men by dividing the classes resulting from distinctions based on sex as persons who face the 
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solid basis for claims of breastfeeding discrimination because it lays a 
foundation for courts to treat breastfeeding and pregnancy as a choice that a 
subclass of women willingly make, rather than equating pregnancy with 
sex.201
However, the PDA does not require the comparability analysis, since 
distinctions based on pregnancy are per se violations of Title VII.202  
Instead, the PDA simply extends the definition of sex to include 
pregnancy.203  In this way, the PDA rejects the use of comparability 
analysis and provides a framework that meets the goal of ensuring 
protection of women in the workplace, even if pregnancy is a choice.204  
This per se approach is the framework that Congress intended and that the 
Supreme Court supported.205  Considering the broad nature of the PDA, the 
logic behind distinguishing pregnancy per se violations of Title VII, despite 
the lack of comparability analysis, and the sex-specific nature of 
breastfeeding, courts have incorrectly withheld the extension of the PDA to 
breastfeeding discrimination claims.206  Finally, the courts erroneously 
related breastfeeding to “child-care” rather than relating breastfeeding to 
pregnancy, further foreclosing the possibility of including protection for 
breastfeeding under the PDA.207
3.  Treating Breastfeeding as a Medical Condition Ignores Its Sex-Specific 
Nature 
Courts avoided the issue of breastfeeding as sex-specific in cases like 
Barrash and Wallace, by confining their analyses to the “related medical 
condition” clause and treating breastfeeding as a trivial medical condition 
risk of pregnancy and those who do not). 
 201. See Julie Manning Magid, Pregnant with Possibility: Reexamining the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act, 38 BUS. L.J. 819, 850 (2001) (arguing that treating pregnancy as a 
subclass and choice, rather than equating it with sex, results in the courts giving less 
deference to pregnancy than to “immutable” traits like race and sex). 
 202. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (defining “because of sex” and “based on sex” to include 
pregnancy); H.R. REP. NO. 95-948, at 3-4 (clarifying that pregnancy discrimination is a per 
se violation of Title VII, under the PDA). 
 203. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-948, at 3 (stating that Congress enacted the PDA “to change 
the definition of sex discrimination”). 
 204. See id. (noting that the PDA ensures “working women are protected against all 
forms of employment discrimination based on sex”). 
 205. See id. (explaining that “distinctions based on pregnancy are per se violations of 
Title VII”); Newport News, 462 U.S. at 684 (stating that the PDA clearly requires courts to 
find that discrimination based on pregnancy is “on its face” discrimination based on sex). 
 206. See Kovacic-Fleischer, supra note 148, at 392 (asserting that, like pregnancy, 
breastfeeding is a biological function that courts should recognize). 
 207. See Wallace, 789 F. Supp. at 869, 879 (citing to the PDA's legislative history in 
examining Congress’s intent to exclude child care from the protection of the PDA, thereby 
relating breastfeeding to childrearing rather than relating breastfeeding to pregnancy); see 
also Kovacic-Fleischer, supra note 148, at 380 (stating that unlike childrearing, 
breastfeeding is not sex-neutral, and that making such comparisons ignores the biological 
differences between men and women). 
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related to pregnancy.208  These court decisions erroneously defined 
breastfeeding as a medical condition.209  Furthermore, in treating 
breastfeeding as a medical condition, the Barrash incapacitation 
requirement wrongly interpreted the PDA narrowly, ignoring the possibility 
that Congress intended more breadth in enacting the Act.210  The more 
courts continue to follow these flawed frameworks, express legislation 
protecting breastfeeding is imperative. 
D.  Implications and Recommendations 
1.  The Medical and Social Benefits of Breastfeeding Augment the 
Importance of Legal Protection of Public Breastfeeding 
The protection of public breastfeeding in Ohio and other states is critical 
due to the numerous benefits breastfeeding provides infants,211 mothers212 
and society.213  Breastfeeding also promotes family values.214  In 
recognition of the importance of breastfeeding to families and society, the 
World Health Organization (“WHO”) advocates the adoption of a global 
public health policy recommending that mothers feed infants exclusively 
through breastfeeding for the first six months of infancy.215  The legal 
 208. See Barrash, 846 F.2d at 931-32 (stating that, to justify discrimination based on sex, 
one would need to compare women and men; however, there is no valid comparison 
between men suffering an incapacitating medical condition and “young mothers wishing to 
nurse little babies”); Wallace, 789 F. Supp. at 869 (stating that the PDA protects medical 
conditions, but finding that breastfeeding is not the type of medical condition that the PDA 
covers). 
 209. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (defining “sex” as including, but not limited to, 
pregnancy); H.R. REP. NO. 95-948, at 5 (extending the PDA’s protection to include all 
matters pertaining to the childbearing process).  But see Isabelle Schallreuter Olson, 
Casenote and Comment, Out of the Mouths of Babes: No Mother’s Milk for U.S. Children, 
The Law and Breastfeeding, 19 HAMLINE L. REV. 269, 302 (1995) (arguing that because of 
the health benefits of breastfeeding and because of the courts characterization of 
breastfeeding as “child rearing,” it is appropriate for courts to analyze breastfeeding as a 
medical condition related to pregnancy under the PDA). 
 210. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-948, at 5 (explaining that the PDA covers a range of matters 
concerning pregnancy and related medical conditions, but does not require incapacitation). 
 211. See BLUEPRINT, supra note 19, at 10-11 (enumerating child health benefits of 
breastfeeding, such as resistance to infectious disease and developmental benefits). 
 212. See id. at 11 (including physical benefits of breastfeeding to the mother such as 
minimizing postpartum maternal blood loss, reducing the risk of menopausal breast and 
ovarian cancers and psychological benefits such as increased self-confidence). 
 213. See id. (noting socioeconomic benefits including a decrease in medical expenditures 
for families and employers and higher employee productivity due to a decrease in parental 
absence from the workplace).  Breastfeeding decreases such parental absence from the 
workplace because breastfed babies generally are sick less often than non-breastfed babies.  
Id. 
 214. See Gordon G. Waggett & Rega Richardson Waggett, Breast is Best: Legis. 
Supporting Breast-Feeding is an Absolute Bare Necessity-A Model Approach, 6 MD. J. 
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 71, 77 (1994-1995) (suggesting that the nurturing nature of 
breastfeeding provides a strong foundation for a child and promotes a natural bond between 
mother and child). 
 215. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., GLOBAL STRATEGY FOR INFANT & YOUNG CHILD 
FEEDING 7 (2003) (reasoning that because breastfeeding is the best way to promote healthy 
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protection of public breastfeeding is important because studies show that 
requiring women to hide or disguise breastfeeding, discouraging women 
from breastfeeding at work, and placing other bans or restrictions on public 
breastfeeding discourages women from choosing to breastfeed their 
children, despite the practice’s physical, psychological and socioeconomic 
value.216
2.  Social Implications of Lack of Legal Protection for Public Breastfeeding 
Currently, at least thirty-six states have some legislation related to 
breastfeeding and at least twenty-three states expressly protect public 
breastfeeding.217  The states that protect public breastfeeding are in line 
with federal policy promoting breastfeeding as the healthiest and most 
desirable form of nutrition for infants.218  Many of these states meet the 
Department of Health and Human Services Healthy People 2010 objective 
of a seventy-five percent rate of mothers breastfeeding their infants.219  
However, Ohio is well below the seventy-five percent objective.220  It is 
quite likely that Ohio’s history of failing to meet the national objective, like 
other states failing to meet the objective, stems from the state’s history of 
lack of legal protection for public breastfeeding.221  When states do not 
protect public breastfeeding, women face discrimination in places of public 
accommodation, embarrassment, low esteem in body image and general 
lack of acceptance.222  These factors weigh heavily on a woman’s decision 
growth and development, governments should ensure that communities and workplaces 
support and accommodate breastfeeding women). 
 216. See, e.g., IMMUNIZATION SURVEY, supra note 82 (reporting that only 64.5% of Ohio 
mothers breastfed their children at any point during infancy).  But see Danielle M. Shelton, 
When Private Goes Public: Legal Protection for Women who Breastfeed in Public and at 
Work, 14 LAW & INEQ. 179, 183 (1995) (noting Norwegian law, which requires employers 
to allow breastfeeding mothers two hours a day to breastfeed, as an example of policy that 
positively impacts breastfeeding rates and results in ninety-nine percent of mothers 
breastfeeding their infants for more than six weeks of infancy). 
 217. See STATE LEGIS., supra note 99 (providing examples of state laws that relate to 
breastfeeding); NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGS., 50 STATES SUMMARY OF BREASTFEEDING 
LAWS (Sept. 2004) (listing the various state laws protecting or promoting breastfeeding), at 
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/breast50.htm (last visited July 24, 2005). 
 218. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1790 (2000) (recognizing breastfeeding as the best method of 
ensuring infant nutrition and implementing a national breastfeeding promotion program). 
 219. See, e.g., CAL. CIVIL CODE § 43.3 (2005) (protecting a mother’s right to breastfeed 
in any place of public accommodation); IMMUNIZATION SURVEY, supra note 82 (reporting 
that 83.7 percent of California mothers have breastfed their infants). 
 220. See IMMUNIZATION SURVEY, supra note 82 (reporting that 64.5 percent of Ohio 
mothers breastfed their infants at any time during infancy).   
 221. See Waggett & Waggett, supra note 214, at 77-78, 81 (arguing that societal 
attitudes about breastfeeding influence a woman’s decision to breastfeed her child and that 
legislation allowing breastfeeding in public is necessary to change society’s negative 
attitudes and encourage mothers to breastfeed their children). 
 222. See, e.g., Derungs, 162 F. Supp. 2d at 864 (stating that Ms. Derungs was “appalled” 
and “embarrassed” when a Wal-Mart employee told her that she had to move to the 
restroom or leave the store while breastfeeding her child because she might offend other 
customers). 
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to breastfeed in public, as well as on her decision to breastfeed at all.223  
Additionally, ignoring the sex-specific nature of breastfeeding adopts a 
rigid, formal vision of equality between men and women.224  A substantive 
approach of equality that recognizes the biological differences between 
men and women would promote equality between men and women in the 
workplace more adequately, thus fulfilling one of the primary goals of the 
PDA.225
3.  Recommendations for Action by Other States 
Because OPAS prohibits sex discrimination but does not expressly 
include protection for breastfeeding discrimination, Ohio’s new law was a 
proper legislative response that will better protect women from 
breastfeeding discrimination in places of public accommodation.226  Over 
nineteen state agencies and organizations went on the record to Senator 
Clancy’s breastfeeding bill, demonstrating the widespread support for 
protecting public breastfeeding.227  States that do not enact similar 
legislation will not protect women who breastfeed in public against 
discrimination.  The lack of willingness of the courts to extend the 
protection of the PDA to breastfeeding results in the fact that states like 
Ohio that protect sex discrimination based on a Title VII model, whether in 
employment or public accommodation statutes, are not protecting against 
breastfeeding discrimination.228  Instead, they must adopt alternative 
legislation expressly protecting public breastfeeding.229  Similarly, outdated 
criminal statutes that criminalize exposure of the female breast provide 
potential barriers to public breastfeeding that states should note in 
 223. See Waggett & Waggett, supra note 214, at 81 (arguing that a woman needs to be 
able to breastfeed her child at any time and in any place in order to be successful at 
breastfeeding). 
 224. See Christrup, supra note 176, at 485-86 (stating that ignoring the sex-specific 
nature of an activity like giving birth or breastfeeding ignores actual differences between 
men and women and that ignoring these differences makes it impossible to consider men 
and women equally). 
 225. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-948, at 3 (noting the primary goal of the PDA is to ensure that 
women are free from sex discrimination in the workplace); see also Katharine T. Bartlett, 
Gender Law, 1 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1, 4-5 (1994) (noting that a substantive equality 
approach, which looks to the results or effects of a law or practice and accounts for 
biological differences, makes up for the effect of a formal equality approach that ignores 
these differences and results in inequality between men and women). 
 226. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3781.55 (West 2005) (Ohio 2005) (requiring that 
proprietors of places of public accommodation allow women to breastfeed). 
 227. See E-mail from Erika Cybulskis, Aide to Senator Patricia Clancy, Ohio Senate, to 
Brianne Whelan (Jan. 28, 2005, 13:37 EST) (on file with author) (listing a number of 
supporters of the bill, such as the Ohio Academy of Family Physicians and the Ohio 
Department of Health, as well as the Executive Director of the Ohio Civil Rights 
Commission, G. Michael Payton). 
 228. See, e.g., Derungs, 374 F.3d at 430 (holding that restrictions on breastfeeding in 
places of public accommodation do not constitute sex discrimination under OPAS). 
 229. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3781.55 (Ohio 2005) (permitting mothers to 
breastfeed in public). 
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considering new legislation.230
 230. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text (examining several state criminal 
statutes involving exposure of the female breast). 
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In February 2003, Senator Olympia J. Snowe introduced a proposal in 
the United States Senate to amend the PDA to include breastfeeding under 
the definition of discrimination based on sex, but the bill never emerged 
from consideration.231  Until Congress adopts legislation like this, or the 
Supreme Court rules on whether Congress intended the PDA to protect 
against discrimination based on breastfeeding, courts may continue to 
resurrect the logic of Gilbert and the PDA will not protect the act of 
breastfeeding.232  Therefore, more states should follow Ohio and adopt 
legislation expressly protecting public breastfeeding. 
CONCLUSION 
Derungs exemplifies the inadequacy of protection for public 
breastfeeding in states lacking specific legislation protecting the practice.233  
Courts are reluctant to rule that breastfeeding discrimination amounts to 
sex discrimination under an employment discrimination analysis.234  This 
analysis employs a rigid formal approach to sex discrimination and equality 
issues.235  Furthermore, the analysis is inconsistent with the PDA’s goal of 
protecting women from discrimination in the workplace and federal 
policies promoting breastfeeding as the healthiest source of nutrition for 
infants.236  Unless courts abandon the use of the overruled Gilbert analysis, 
statutes that prohibit sex discrimination in the employment context or in 
places of public accommodation will not protect public breastfeeding 
adequately.237  While Ohio’s law may not completely nullify the Derungs 
holding,238 more states should adopt similar legislation because it will 
 231. See Pregnancy Discrimination Act Amendments of 2001, S. 418, 108th Cong. 
(2003) (proposing to include the term “breastfeeding” after the term “childbirth” in the 
PDA).  The Senate assigned the bill to the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor 
and Pensions on February 14, 2003.  Id. 
 232. See, e.g., Wallace, 789 F. Supp. at 869 (holding that excluding breastfeeding from 
situations in which employers will grant employees personal leave is not sex discrimination 
“under the principles set forth in Gilbert”). 
 233. See Derungs, 374 F.3d at 430 (holding that OPAS does not prohibit places of public 
accommodation from restricting or banning public breastfeeding). 
 234. See, e.g., Martinez, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 309-11 (holding that an employer’s inability 
to provide privacy for, and prevent the harassment of, a female employee’s breast pumping 
did not amount to sex discrimination under Title VII because the PDA does not cover 
breastfeeding as a basis, per se, for sex discrimination). 
 235. See supra notes 224-25 and accompanying text (describing the different effects of 
employing a substantive equality approach rather than a formal equality approach on 
breastfeeding claims). 
 236. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-948, at 3 (acknowledging the primary goal of the PDA as the 
protection of women from all forms of workplace discrimination); H.R. REP. NO. 102-645, 
at 4 (recognizing the importance of federal promotion of breastfeeding because of the 
numerous health benefits breastfeeding provides). 
 237. See, e.g., Derungs, 374 F.3d at 430 (holding that places of public accommodation 
may ban breastfeeding because such restrictions do not constitute sex discrimination). 
 238. Compare OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3781.55 (West 2005) (providing an affirmative 
right to breastfeed), with OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.05(B) (West 2005) (providing a 
private right of action for sex discrimination claims). 
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better protect women who breastfeed and will result in consistency with the 
federal and state promotion of breastfeeding.239
 
 239. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN § 3781.55 (West 2005) (proposing to amend Ohio law to 
require places of public accommodation to allow public breastfeeding); Waggett & Waggett, 
supra note 214, at 81-83 (arguing that legislation allowing women to breastfeed in public is 
necessary to overcome the pervasiveness of society's negative attitudes towards 
breastfeeding that create barriers to a woman’s ability to breastfeed her child any time or 
place). 
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